In a warning, Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s deputy chairman of the Security Council, declared in June that the undersea cables essential to global communications had become a legitimate target for Russian forces.
This announcement followed the explosion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which Russia attributed to Western interference, though recent reports suggest Ukraine may have been responsible.
The vast network of undersea fiber-optic cables is the backbone of international data transfer, linking continents and enabling the global flow of information. However, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), these cables are increasingly vulnerable to hostile actions by state actors like Russia. This concern was echoed by NATO’s intelligence chief, David Cattler, in May when he warned that Russia might target these cables in retaliation for Western support of Ukraine in the ongoing conflict.
“If we proceed from the proven complicity of Western countries in blowing up the Nord Streams, then we have no constraints—even moral—left to prevent us from destroying the ocean floor cable communications of our enemies,” Medvedev stated.
The implications of such a threat are profound. The destruction or disruption of these cables could cripple internet services globally, disrupting everything from financial transactions to essential communications. The vulnerability of this critical infrastructure has NATO planners increasingly alarmed, as any significant damage could have widespread economic and security consequences.
The threat extends beyond undersea cables. In recent months, Russia has been accused of interfering with GPS navigation systems, leading to significant disruptions in commercial airline routes. Flights from Helsinki to Tartu, Estonia, were halted for an entire month in April due to GPS interference, which security experts like Melanie Garson from University College London attribute to Russia’s “gray zone” tactics—covert operations that avoid direct military conflict but cause significant disruption.
“Russia has long been developing this capability, and it is currently a cheap and effective way of malicious gray-zone interference,” Garson noted. As global reliance on connectivity and space-based data increases, the potential impact of such disruptions on national and economic security becomes more severe.
The history of undersea cables as potential military targets dates back to the Cold War, with both the US and USSR closely monitoring these critical infrastructures. Today, these cables are more vital than ever, transmitting 95% of the world’s international data across approximately 745,000 miles of underwater network.
“The growth in electronic communications has made the undersea cables—a point of vulnerability for nations who use them extensively and for those who don’t publicly have an obvious fallback position,” said Robert Dover, a professor of international security at Hull University in the UK.
Similarly, GPS systems are crucial for the airline industry, guiding planes safely to their destinations. Although planes are equipped with backup navigation systems, disrupted GPS signals still pose significant risks. During the conflict in Ukraine, Russia has enhanced its electronic warfare capabilities, allowing it to scramble GPS signals remotely, affecting not only military operations but also commercial aviation in Eastern and Northern Europe.
“The targeting of civil-aviation GPS is a means by which to undermine the surety of Western publics in aviation,” Dover added.
In response to these threats, NATO has begun to take more proactive measures. Foreign Policy reported that the alliance is setting up systems to automatically detect and warn of attempted interference with undersea cables. However, experts like Garson argue that this is not enough. She stresses the need for robust government fallback plans to ensure resilience if these critical systems fail.
“Countries need to not only take measures to protect but also ensure that the communications system is resilient, e.g., with robust alternatives,” Garson emphasized.
The CSIS report also highlighted the need for increased international cooperation to coordinate responses to potential attacks on undersea cables, noting that the current legal framework for addressing such sabotage is “complex and fragmented.”
